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RésuméL'intention est de présenter ľidée de complémentarité de façon à la fois générale et élémentaire, convenant à la fois en physique et dans ?autres domaines. Le progrés se fait par dévoilement ?horizons de réalité successifs, dont trois sont envisageés ici: ľhorizon naturel , ľhorizon classique, ľhorizon quantique.L'idée de complémentarité se présente assez élémentairement dans le raccordement de deux horizons, dont ľun joue le rô1e ?horizon apparent et ľautre ?horizon profond.Le cadre obligé de considérations de ce genre est une méthodologie dialectique (...) ouverte. Dans ce cadre, ľidée de la complémentarité onde‐corpuscule apparaît comme une spécialisation ?un schéma plus géneral. F. G.ZnsammenfassungDie Idee der Komplementarität soll zugleich generell und elementar, auf eine für die moderne Physik und für andere Gebiete passende Art, dargelegt werden.Der Fortschritt der Erkenntnis führt zu der Konstituierung von aufeinander folgenden Wirklichkeitshorizonten. Es werden hier drei solche Horizonte besprochen : der natürliche Horizont , der klassische und der quantische Horizont.Die Idee der Komplementarität spielt eine Hauptrolle in der Beziehung zweier Wirklichkeitshorizonten zueinander, eines phänomenalen und eines tieferen Horizonts.Der notwendige erkenntnistheoretische Rahmen für derartige Betrachtungen ist eine dialektiseh‐offene Methodologie . In diesen Rahmen erscheint die übliche Komplementarität als eine Speziali‐sierung eines allgemeineren Schemas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE INCOMMUNICABILITY OF HUMAN PERSONS JOHN F. CROSBY, III Franciscan University of Steubenville Steubenville, Ohio I PROPOSE TO explore the idea that persons do not exist as replaceable specimens of or as mere instances of an ideal or type, but rather exist in some sense for their own sakes, each existing as incommunicably his or her own.1 I undertake this study in the conviction that the incommunicability of persons (...) is profoundly characteristic for them precisely as persons, and has a major role to play in any philosophy of the person. And there is an entirely different reason which attracts me to this subject. I think that most of what I have to say here can find acceptance across a broad spectrum of philosophical positions. At a time when thinkers are increasingly suspicious of universally valid truth about man, when many of them think that a vision of man is proper only to some tradition and valid only within that tradition and not beyond it, one can offer a salutary challenge to one's contemporaries by showing a centrally important truth about persons which, as I say, can be accepted by philosophers coming from the most various points of view. Suppose that you were to minimalize the death of someone by saying that at least the human species did not die with him or her, as if the immortality of the species more than compensated for the mortality of this individual : everyone understands that you would thereby radically depersonalize the deceased. Or suppose that you were grieving over the death of someone dear to you, and a friend tried to comfort you with the thought that the 1 My thanks to Josef Seifert, William Frank, Damian Fedoryka, and Katryna Fedoryka for their comments on earlier drafts of this study. The text of this article forms Chapter Two of my book, Essay on Personal Selfhood, which is close to completion. 403 404 JOHN F. CROSBY, III particular excellences of the deceased, which awakened your love, also exist in other human beings who are still living, as if you could continue to love in them what you had loved in the deceased. Again, everyone understands that if you treat people having excellences as if they were replaceable specimens of those excellences, then you lose your grip on them as persons. But why is this? Why is personhood driven out of human beings as soon as their species-membership, or their particular excellences, are thought to predominate in them? What is that incommunicability of each person which is obscured as soon as persons are thought to be only specimens? One commonly thinks that this aspect of personal selfhood has been recognized only in modern thought; in fact it was recognized already by St. Thomas Aquinas. Creatura autem rationalis divinae providentiae substat sicut secundum se gubernata et provisa, non solum propter speciem, ut aliae corruptibiles creaturae : quia individuum quod gubernatur solum propter speciem, non gubernatur propter seipsum; creatura autem rationalis propter seipsam gubernatur, ut ex dictis manifestum est. Sic igitur solae rationales creaturae directionem a Deo ad suos actus accipiunt non solum propter speciem, sed secundum individuum.2 Notice that Aquinas teaches here the metaphysical ultimacy of personal incommunicability; it exists even before God in the sense 2 " Now, a rational creature exists under divine providence as a being governed and provided for in himself, and not simply for the sake of his species, as is the case with other corruptible creatures. For the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species is not governed for its own sake, but the rational creature is governed for his own sake, as is clear from what we have said (ch. 112). And so, only rational creatures receive direction from God in their acts, not only for the species, but for the individual." Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 113 (Bourke translation). By the way, Chapters 111-114 of Book III seem to me to constitute the most " personalist " passage' in the entire corpus of St. Thomas. The modern reader sees to his amazement that St. Thomas here has already made his own the Kantian idea that each person in a sense exists for his... (shrink)

My apology for reverting to this subject is a recent article by Mr. W. C. F. Walters in the April number of the Classical Quarterly for 1910 on the signatures in the Vatican Codex . Mr. Walters does not seem to have been aware that this manuscript, though not of direct value in the constitution of the text of Livy, is one whose interest from a palaeographical point of view has long been recognized. A number of articles have been written (...) concerning it, most of which deal with the signatures, the subject of Mr. Walters' paper, more fully and more accurately than he has done. Beyond giving the signatures, two of them incorrectly, Walters does nothing more than to conclude that there were eight scribes, who copied 42 quaternions. But a great deal more than this is known about the scribes and the manuscript. In fact, thanks to the ingenious combinations of Chatelain and Traube in piecing together the hints suggested by the signatures, more is known about this particular manuscript and the circumstances under which it was made than is the case with any other manuscript of a classical author of so early a date. It may therefore be worth while to summarize the known data concerning the manuscript, with a brief account of how they were worked out, referring the reader for the details to the articles mentioned in the footnotes. (shrink)

First published in 1912, this book by F. R. Tennant was intended to redress the vague and inconsistent conceptions of sin that were popularly held at the beginning of the twentieth century. Tennant maintained that for any ongoing debate to remain meaningful, it was imperative that definitions of key terms should keep pace with discussion. Therefore his study aimed at providing a clear, logical definition of what sin in Christian doctrine represented, whilst also bringing to bear the importance of ethics (...) and psychology to any modern understanding of the subject. (shrink)

In this paper, it is explained that a dialogical approach to complex argumentation can be fruitful for solving two important problems concerning the analysis of the argumentation structure. First, such an approach makes it possible to clarify the distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation structures, and to identify clues in the presentation for each of these structures. Second, a dialogical approach can provide a basis for dealing more adequately with refutations of counterarguments.

Objectives: to assess physicians’ and patients’ views in Saudi Arabia towards involving the patient versus the family in the process of diagnosis disclosure and decision-making, and to compare them with views from the USA and Japan.Design: A self-completion questionnaire was translated to Arabic and validated.Participants: Physicians from different specialties and ranks and patients in a hospital or attending outpatient clinics from 6 different regions in KSA.Results: In the case of a patient with incurable cancer, 67% of doctors and 51% of (...) patients indicated that they would inform the patient in preference to the family of the diagnosis . Assuming the family already knew, 56% of doctors and 49% of patients would tell the patient even if family objected . However, in the case of HIV infection, 59% of physicians and 81% of patients would inform the family about HIV status without the patient’s consent . With regards to withholding ventilatory support, about 50% of doctors and over 60% of patients supported the use of mechanical ventilation in a patient with advanced cancer, regardless of the wishes of the patient or the family. Finally, the majority of doctors and patients were against assisted suicide.Conclusions: Although there was more recognition for a patient’s autonomy amongst physicians, most patients preferred a family centred model of care. Views towards information disclosure were midway between those of the USA and Japan. Distinctively, however, decisions regarding life prolonging therapy and assisted suicide were not influenced to a great extent by wishes of the patient or family, but more likely by religious beliefs. (shrink)

From the editors of Voprosy filosofii: December 23, 1972, marked the seventieth birthday of A. F. Shishkin, leading Soviet philosopher, major specialist in the field of ethics, one of the oldest and at the same time most active members of the editorial board of our journal. The editors sincerely congratulate Aleksandr Fedorovich on this anniversary and wish him further successes in his work, firm health, and long years of life.

The editors planned the appearance of this article to coincide with the seventy-fifth birthday of the author, which was to have been marked in December. The issue had already been approved for publication when the sad news came of the sudden death of Aleksandr Fedorovich Shishkin, prominent Soviet philosopher, member of the editorial board of our journal, a remarkable human being, our comrade and friend.

OBJECTIVES: To study some ethical problems created by accession of a previously nomadic and traditional society to modern invasive medicine, by assessment of physicians' attitudes towards sharing information and decision-making with patients in the setting of a serious illness. DESIGN: Self-completion questionnaire administered in 1993. SETTING: Riyadh, Jeddah, and Buraidah, three of the largest cities in Saudi Arabia. SURVEY SAMPLE: Senior and junior physicians from departments of internal medicine and critical care in six hospitals in the above cities. RESULTS: A (...) total of 249 physicians participated in the study. Less than half indicated they provided information on diagnosis and prognosis of serious illnesses all the time. Physicians who were more senior and those who spoke Arabic fared better than other groups. The majority preferred to discuss information with close relatives rather than patients, even when the patients were mentally competent. Most of the physicians felt patients had the right to refuse a specific treatment modality, and 68% denied patients the right to demand such a treatment if considered futile. Further analysis showed that physicians' attitudes varied along a spectrum from passive to paternalistic with the largest group in a balanced position. CONCLUSIONS: In traditional societies where physicians are regarded as figures of authority and family ties are important, there is a considerable shift of access to information and decision-making from patients to their physicians and relatives in a manner that threatens patients' autonomy. Ethical principles, wider availability of invasive medical technology and a rise in public awareness dictate an attitude change. (shrink)

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appears to use an elegant short argument to attack Plato's doctrine of the good, which argument equally appears to attack Aristotle's own doctrine of the good. I consider these two questions: First: Why does Aristotle reverse the judgment of Socrates/Plato on the issue: Which is better - things that are good in themselves, or things that are both good in themselves and good for their consequences? Second: Why does Aristotle attack Plato's doctrine that the Form (...) of the Good is the chief good, with an argument that appears to threaten his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good? I think the answers to these two questions are related. The elegant short argument in question I call "Aristotle's Fast Argument." After apologizing for criticizing views held by friends of his, Aristotle deploys the Fast Argument as a clincher to cap off his refutation of Plato's view that the Form of the Good is the chief good: "And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by 'a thing itself', if in man himself and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will there be a difference in so far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day.". I explore this sketchily presented Fast Argument. I consider why Aristotle may think it is valid and why he does not seem to realize that, on readings that make it effective against Plato's view, his Fast Argument also seems to apply to his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good. This is what I will call "Aristotle's Dilemma." If the Fast Argument is interpreted too narrowly, its point about the whiteness of a white thing being independent of its duration will not apply to the goodness of the Form of the Good. If it is interpreted broadly enough to undermine the claim of the Form of the Good to be the chief good, it will equally undermine that claim for eudaimonia. Finally, I discuss some of the things Plato and Aristotle say about the chief good, and comparable things Immanuel Kant says about the good will. I draw some speculative conclusions that focus on the importance for Aristotle of the goodness of the chief good not being at risk. (shrink)

This passage seems to have escaped identification so far. This is somewhat surprising, since it clearly refers to an incident at the sack of Maiozamalcha during Julian's Persian campaign which has been much discussed by editors ind critics of Ammianus and Zosimus. The reason may well be that in some ilder editions of Suidas the name appears as.

The spin-statistics connection has been proved for nonrelativistic quantum mechanics . The proof is extended here to the relativistic regime using the parametrized Dirac equation. A causality condition is not required.

The parametrized Duffin–Kemmer–Petiau wave equation is formulated for many relativistic particles of spin-0 or spin-1. The first-quantized formulation lacks the fields of creation and annihilation operators which satisfy commutation relations subject to causality conditions, and which are essential to the Quantum Field Theoretic proof of the spin-statistics connection. It is instead proved that the wavefunctions for identical particles must be symmetric by extension of the nonrelativistic argument of Jabs. The causal commutators of Quantum Field Theory restrict entanglement to separations of (...) the order of the Compton wavelength \. The entanglement manifest in the symmetric Duffin–Kemmer–Petiau wavefunctions is unrestricted. (shrink)